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COMMUNITY COMPETENCE FOR MATTERS OF JUDICIAL
COOPERATION AT THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES
Ronald A. Brand*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Amsterdam Treaty's introduction of Article 65 into the European
Community Treaty took little time to achieve practical importance. In fact, the
questions were practical as early as they were theoretical. A 1992 request by
the United States that the Hague Conference on Private International Law
negotiate a global convention on jurisdiction and the recognition of civil
judgments resulted in a laboratory for the new-found competence of the
Community.
Thus, negotiations already underway-which included
delegations from all 15 EU Member States-were affected significantly by the

transfer of competence from those states to the Community institutions for
matters under consideration at The Hague.

The transfer of competence for judicial cooperation resulted in tensions
internal to the Community and at the same time changed the dynamics at the
Hague Conference, where other delegations were left for several years to
consider just what the source of authority was for potential conclusion of a
global treaty that would be effective in the Community. This article traces the
history of the negotiations at The Hague, considers the parallel changes on the
same issues within the Community, and reviews from a U.S. perspective the
resulting cross-currents. While the evolution of Community competence
concurrent with ongoing negotiations at The Hague caused uncertainty for
negotiators, it also served to highlight the developing role of the European
Union as a player in an area previously untouched by Community institutions
on an external basis. It also tested the global role of the Hague Conference as
a traditionally Euro-centric organization that now must expand its reach in
*
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Commission negotiating the Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
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order to remain viable when private international law for Europe will be
developed in Brussels. Finally, it accented further the differences in
conceptual approaches to judicial jurisdiction, especially between the United
States and continental civil law systems. In doing so, it demonstrated that
Community competence for external relations in judicial cooperation requires
special attention to the relationship between the United States and the
European Union.
II.

THE HAGUE NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGING COMPETENCE IN EUROPE

In May of 1992, the United States proposed that the Hague Conference
on Private International Law take up the negotiation of a multilateral
convention on the recognition and enforcement ofjudgments.' In October of
1992, a Working Group at The Hague "unanimously recognized the
desirability of attempting to negotiate multilaterally through the Hague
Conference a convention on recognition and enforcement ofjudgments."2 The
Seventeenth Session of the Hague Conference, in May of 1993, decided to
study the matter further through a Special Commission Session.3 In June of
1994, a Special Commission of the Hague Conference recommended that the
question be included in the Agenda for the future work of the Conference at
its Eighteenth Session, and in June of 1995, the Special Commission on
General Affairs and Policy of the Conference recommended to the Eighteenth
Session of the Hague Conference (held in October 1996) that the proposal for
a judgments convention be adopted as one of the works of that Session.
At the Eighteenth Session of the Hague Conference, it was decided "to
include in the Agenda of the Nineteenth Session the question of jurisdiction,
and recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial
matters."5 The formal negotiations began in June 19976 Additional

1. Letter of May 5, 1992 from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to
Georges Droz, Secretary General, The Hague Conference on Private International Law, distributed with
Hague Conference document L.c. ON No. 15 (1992). Official Hague Conference Documents relating to
negotiations may be found at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprogljdgm.html.
2.
Conclusionsof the Working GroupMeeting on Enforcement of Judgments,Hague Conference
on Private International Law, Doc. L.c. ON No. 2 (1993).
3.
HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, SEVENTEENTH SESSION FINAL ACT 17
(1993).
4.
Conclusions of the Special Commission of June 1995 on general affairs and policy of the
Conference, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Prel. Doc. No. 9, at 31 (Dec. 1995).
5.
FinalAct of the EighteenthSession of the Hague Conference on PrivateInternationalLaw, 19
Oct. 1996, at 21.
6.
Preliminary Results of the Work of the Special Commission Concerning the Proposed

2002]

COMMUNITY COMPETENCE

negotiating sessions were held in March 1998, November 1998, and June
1999. At the session in October 1999, a Preliminary Draft text of the
Convention emerged through traditional Hague Conference procedures that
involved inclusion of provisions that received support of a majority of the
delegations present and voting.7
A Diplomatic Conference originally was contemplated to take place in the
fall of 2000. This course was altered, however, after the letter in February
2001 from Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International
Law at the U.S. State Department, to the Secretary General of the Hague
Conference,' detailing substantial problems with the Preliminary Draft
Convention text. At a meeting of the Hague Conference Special Commission
on General Affairs and Policy in May of 2000, it was decided to delay the
diplomatic conference, and to divide it into two parts.9 The first two week
session was scheduled for June 2001, with the final session to be at a later
date. l" This resulted in informal meetings in Washington in October 2000, in
Basel in December 2000, in Geneva in January 2001, in Ottawa in February
2001, and in Edinburgh in April 2001, all designed to prepare for the
consensus process chosen to apply at the June 2001 session of the diplomatic
conference.
The two weeks of diplomatic conference in June of 2001 resulted in a
second full text draft, the "Interim Text."" This text is much longer than the
Preliminary Draft Convention text of October 1999, including numerous
alternatives, variations and bracketed language in many provisions. It thus

Convention on International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Information Document (Sept. 1997).
7.
The text of the Preliminary Draft Convention is available at http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/draft36e.html.
8.
Letter of February 22, 2000 from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private
International Law to Mr. J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conference on Private International
Law (copy on file with the author).
9. Hague Conferenceon Private International Law,Conclusions ofthe Special Commission ofMay
2000 on General Affairs and Policy ofthe Conference, Prel. Doe. No. 10 (June 2000). This part oftheMay
2000 decision is also repeated in The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Informational note
on the work of the informal meetings held since October 1999 to consider and develop drafts on
outstanding items, Prel. Doc. No. 15 (May 2001) at 1.
10. Conclusions of the Special Commission of May 2000, supra note 9, at 10.
11. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission I,Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Summary ofthe Outcome ofthe Discussion in Commission
I of the First Part oftheDiplomatic Conference 6-20 June 2001, Interim Text [hereinafter Interim Text],
available at http://www.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html. (visited April 4, 2002).
12. Bracketed language in a Hague Conference document indicates that no decision has been
reached on the inclusion or exclusion of that language.
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provides a lengthy catalogue of negotiating positions, but is not particularly
useful in working toward a final convention.
While this process was going on in The Hague, the European Community
was moving forward on deepening cooperation among its Member States, and
increasing competence of Community institutions. While private international
law specialists were representing the Community Member States at the Hague
in June of 1997, their trade law counterparts were meeting in the Amsterdam
Treaty process to draft language that would change the role of those
specialists. Whether the trade specialists ever consulted the private
international law specialists on these changes is not clear. What is clear is that
the language of the Treaty of Amsterdam has changed dramatically the role
of national private international law specialists in the Hague negotiations.
The transfer of internal competence for matters of judicial cooperation to
Community institutions is described well by Wilderspin and Kotuby in the
other articles in this symposium.' 3 The implications of that competence for
external relations became a matter of tension in the Hague negotiations, with
national delegations often claiming it would not change their roles, and
Community observers quietly preparing for that change. The result was a shift
in negotiating dynamics after the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on
May 1, 1999. While Article 65 provides only internal competence for matters
of judicial cooperation,1 4 the completion of the "Brussels I" Regulation in
December of 2000 completed this shift by asserting internal competence in a

13. See, e.g., Michael Wilderspin, New Possiblilities for Cooperation with the European
Union-The Transferof Conipetencefrom Member States to Community Institution: The Foundations and
the Inplementation of the Transfer of Competence in the Area of Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters
to the Community Institutions, 21 J. L. & CoM. 181 (2002); Charles Kotuby, Internal Development and
External Effects: The Federalization of Private International Law in the European Comnunity and its
Consequences for Transnational Litigants, 21 J. L. & COM. 157 (2002).
14. Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Text) art. 65 (ex. art. 73m), 1997
O.J. C 340 at 173, 203 (Nov. 10, 1997). This article provides as follows:
Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, to
be taken in accordance with Article 67 and insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the
internal market, shall include:
(a) improving and simplifying
-the system for cross-border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents;
-cooperation in the taking of evidence;
-the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, including
decisions in extrajudicial cases;
(b) promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning the conflict
of laws and of jurisdiction;
(c) eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting
the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States.
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manner that absorbed external competence as well for the Community
institutions. 5
The opportunity existed after the June 2001 meeting to consult informally
and reach agreement on a course that could lead to a successful result of the
Hague negotiations. This led to a decision in a meeting in The Hague in
April 2002 to proceed with negotiations that would focus on a more modest
of choice of court clauses in business-toconvention limited to enforcement
6
relationships.'
business
II. THE MIXED CONVENTION APPROACH TO A TREATY ON JURISDICTION
AND JUDGMENTS

The assumption early in the Hague negotiations to work toward a
"mixed" convention was significant in that it set the stage for a new type of
convention that did not yet exist in practice. Single (sometimes referred to as
"simple") conventions on the recognition ofjudgments deal only with indirect
jurisdiction and apply only to the decision of the court asked to enforce a
foreign judgment.' 7 Thus, the recognizing court considers the jurisdiction of
the court issuing a judgment in deciding whether to recognize the judgment
of the originating court. Double conventions, like the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions,'8 not only deal with recognition, but also provide direct
jurisdiction rules applicable in the court in which the case is first
brought-thus addressing the matter from the outset and preempting the need
for substantial indirect consideration of the issuing court's jurisdiction by the

15. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 Dec. 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, O.J. L12/1 (2001) [hereinafter Brussels
Regulation] (entered into force on Mar. 1,2002). The regulation replaced the Brussels Convention that had
been the most successful example of regional judicial cooperation in history in the areas ofjurisdiction and
enforcement ofjudgments. European Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, done at Brussels, Sept. 27, 1968, 41 O.J. Eur. Comm. (C 27/1) (Jan. 26, 1998)
(consolidated and updated version of the 1968 Convention and the Protocol of 1971, following the 1996
accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden) [hereinafter

Brussels Convention].
16. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission I on General Affairs and Policy
held on 22-24 Apr. 2002 (Summary prepared by the Permanent Bureau) 2-3.
17. For a more complete discussion of convention structure, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Enforcing
Judgments Abroad: Reflections on the Design of Recognition Conventions, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 17
(1998).
18. Brussels Convention, supra note 15; European Communities-European Free Trade Association:
Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, done at
Lugano, Sept. 16, 1988, O.J. Eur. Comm. (L 319/9) (Nov. 25, 1988), reprintedin 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989)
[hereinafter Lugano Convention].
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court asked to recognize the resulting judgment. The mixed convention is a
variation on the double convention, providing rules for both jurisdiction and
the recognition of judgments, but not purporting to be exhaustive in its lists
of required and prohibited bases of jurisdiction. It does not cover the entire
field, but rather leaves some bases ofj urisdiction available under national law.
Under the mixed convention approach, there would exist a list of required
bases of jurisdiction and a list of prohibited bases of jurisdiction. Judgments
founded on required bases of jurisdiction would be entitled to recognition
under the convention. 9 Courts should not exercise jurisdiction founded only
on bases on the prohibited list. For a few other situations, some exceptions to
recognition would apply. Any jurisdictional basis not included on one of the
two lists would be permitted, but a resulting judgment would not be entitled
to recognition under the convention. Instead, such judgments would be
subject to review in the recognizing court in the manner applicable in the
absence of a treaty.
The benefit of a mixed convention in the negotiation process is that it
allows the Hague member states to build up a convention from the status quo,
and does not require agreement on a comprehensive set of jurisdictional rules
that cover and connect the entire field of possibilities. It also allows the use
of a consensus process more likely to produce a convention acceptable to the
largest number of states.20 It therefore allows some areas of disagreement and
experimentation to continue while at the same time locking in progress that
can be achieved. A mixed convention also allows certain issues that are
unresolved in any single national legal system to remain outside the
convention and subject to later conventions or protocols should an acceptable
approach be developed. This is particularly important in regard tojurisdiction
for matters involving intellectual property rights and electronic commerce;
issues for which no legal system has yet developed a satisfactory, fixed set of
rules, and for which it would be presumptuous to believe a global solution
could be found and then imposed by treaty within the near future.2 '
While the negotiating process began with discussion of a mixed
convention, it was not until June of 1999 that the'Special Commission voted
19. For a chart of the relationship of jurisdictional and recognition provisions of the Interim Text,
see Ronald A. Brand, Where to from Here? Prospectsfor a Hague Convention on Jurisdictionand the
Enforcement of Judgments, 16 INT'L ARB. RPr. 38, 41 (Issue 10, October 2001).
20. See Ronald A. Brand, JurisdictionalCommon Ground: In Search ofA GlobalConvention, LAW
AND JUSTICE INA MULTI-STATE WORLD: ESSAYS INHONOR OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN (James A.R.
Nafziger & Simeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002).
21. See Ronald A. Brand, Intellectual Property,Electronic Commerce and the PreliminaryDraft
Hague Jurisdictionand Judgments Convention, 62 U. Prrr. L. REv. 581-603 (2001).
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specifically to adopt the mixed convention model. 22 The intervening sevenyear ambivalence of focus resulted in the primary development of double
convention language. Thus, even in the June 2001 Interim Text, which
purports to follow a mixed convention approach, the words often are those of
a double convention. Given that the negotiations prior to June 2001 were
conducted by majority vote, and that fifteen of the member states voting on
specific articles during the process were Member States of the European
Union-and others were states eager to become Member States of the EU-it
is not surprising that the Draft and Interim Text language looks much like that
of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions in force in the EU states. It also is
not surprising that the EU states would prefer a convention that looks as much
as possible like the sets of rules they customarily apply in similar cases within
their regional system. The problem is that such an approach has led to great
difficulty in developing a convention that will work on a global basis. In
particular, the resulting text led to many problems for the United States, which
has a jurisdictional system based on constitutional limitations that result in a
different focus than do the rules of the civil law-oriented Brussels system.23
IV. PROBLEMS ON THE WAY TO A MIXED CONVENTION
After the creation of the October 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention
Text, there were at least four significant problems:
1)

2)

the majority vote process of the Hague Conference had created a
document that largely mirrored the Brussels and Lugano
Conventions;
the Brussels Convention approach to language was largely
unacceptable to the United States (as well as other states), in part
because it failed to take into account the due process jurisprudence
that would make it work in the U.S. system;

22. Preliminary draft Convention on jurisdiction and the effects of judgments in civil and
commercial matters, adopted provisionally by the Special Commission, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Special Commission on International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Working Document No. 241 (18 June 1999).
23. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Due Processas a Limitation on Jurisdictionin U.S. Courts and a
Limitation on the United Statesat the Hague Conferenceon PrivateInternationalLaw, 60 U. PITT. L. REV.
661 (1999).
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efforts to force all bases of jurisdiction into either the required or the
prohibited list created unnecessary "canonization" and
"demonization" of jurisdictional bases; 24 and
4) the text dealt with issues not yet resolved even in national legal
systems, such as jurisdiction in cases arising from electronic
commerce, intellectual property rights, and the application of new
technology to commercial relationships.
These problems were addressed in form with the decision in May of 2000. At
that point, however, four new dimensions to the negotiations had emerged:
3)

1) a decision had been made to operate on the basis of consensus, at
least through the June 2001 portion of the Diplomatic Conference
(which was a substantial departure from traditional Hague
Conference majority vote procedures);
2) competence for judicial cooperation in both internal and external
matters had been transferred from the European Community Member
States to the Community institutions;
3) the Diplomatic Conference had been split into at least two sessions,
with the first session scheduled but the second session left open on
the calendar; and
4) there was no consensus working text-the Preliminary Draft
Convention text had been arrived at by majority vote on individual
provisions, sometimes over substantial objection by a dissenting
delegation.
Unfortunately, the Interim Text of June 2001 neither solved the problems
of the Preliminary Draft Convention text nor responded adequately to the new
dimensions in the negotiations. Through the inclusion of numerous
alternatives and variations on many provisions, and the continued (and
enlarged) use of bracketed text to indicate language on which agreement had
not been achieved, the Interim Text was in fact more confusing than the
October 1999 Preliminary Draft Convention text. Four delegations formally
suggested that the negotiations focus on true consensus, building up a
convention in areas of substantial agreement, and setting aside areas in which
consensus was unlikely. But this remained no more than a Working
Document not represented in the Interim Text.2"

24. For a more complete discussion of this problem, see von Mehren, supra note 17.
25. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Commission II: Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Working Document No. 97 (June 18, 2001).

2002]

COMMUNITY COMPETENCE

V. COMMON GROUND FOR BRIDGING SYSTEMIC DIFFERENCES IN
JURISDICTIONAL RULES

While over a decade of focus on ajurisdiction and judgments convention
at The Hague has not resulted in a final treaty, it has demonstrated common
ground upon which a successful convention might be built. Areas in which
consensus on concepts (though not necessarily on language) is possible
include rules that would approve of the exercise of jurisdiction (1) in the
courts of the state chosen by agreement of the parties; (2) in the courts of the
state of the defendant's habitual residence; (3) for cases of physical tort, inthe
courts of the state in which the act causing injury occurred and in the state
where the injury materializes, so long as in the latter case the defendant has
engaged in conduct in that state and it is reasonable to assume jurisdiction; (4)
in the courts of the state in which the defendant operates through a branch,
agency, or establishment, so long as the claim arises out of the activity of the
branch, agency, or establishment; and (5) for counterclaims in the court where
the original action is brought under another accepted basis of jurisdiction.26
Beyond these bases, the rules of jurisdiction contained in the October
1999 and June 2001 texts are not the focus of sufficient agreement to warrant
inclusion in a global convention. Even as to the five bases considered here,
the level of consensus, and the problems of drafting, require careful
consideration of just how far it is reasonable to go in a final convention.
Certain of these provisions, if enshrined as required bases ofjurisdiction in a
mixed convention, will require the consideration of other provisions dealing
with issues such as forum non conveniens, lis alibipendens, and review of
damages by the recognizing court. Thus, their inclusion brings additional
problems in reaching a consensus text.
VI.

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES TO JURISDICTION

While it may be an oversimplification, the world's legal systems provide
two fundamental approaches to basic concepts ofjurisdiction. A combination
of these approaches is found both in the Hague texts and in the Brussels I
Regulation. One approach bases adjudicatory authority on a connection

26. For discussion of the level of agreement on these bases of agreement, see Ronald A. Brand,
Concepts, Consensusand the Status Quo Zone: Getting to "Yes "on a HagueJurisdictionandJudgments
Convention, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (C. Charmody ed., 2002).
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between the court and theparty over whomjurisdiction is being exercised (the
defendant).27 The second approach looks to a connection between the court
and the claim.28
Like the Brussels Regulation, the two Hague texts incorporate both of
these approaches to jurisdiction. Articles 3 (habitual residence of the
defendant) and 9 (branch, agency or establishment of the defendant) require
a relationship between the court and the defendant. Article 4 (choice of court)
also is related to the nexus between the court and the defendant, representing
voluntary acceptance of the jurisdictional authority of the court by the
defendant. Articles 6 (contracts), 7 (consumer contracts), 8 (employment
contracts), 10 (torts or delicts), 11 (trusts), and 12 (exclusive jurisdiction)
follow the second approach, focusing instead on a nexus between the court
and the claim.
The connection between the court and the defendant is the preferred
nexus in both the Hague texts and the Brussels Regulation, as well as the
focus of U.S. jurisdictional jurisprudence. Article 3 of the Hague texts
provides for jurisdiction in the courts of the state in which the defendant is
habitually resident. Article 2 of the Brussels Regulation likewise provides for
jurisdiction in the courts of the state in which the defendant is domiciled. In
the Brussels context, Article 2 jurisdiction is referred to as the "general" rule
ofjurisdiction, with other rules (including the tort provision of Article 5(3)),
referred to as "special" rules of jurisdiction.
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State are,
subject to the provisions of the Convention, 'whatever their nationality, to be sued in the
courts of that State.' Section 2 of Title II of the Convention, however, provides for

27. This is the approach found in the "general" jurisdictional rule of Article 3 of the Brussels
Convention (jurisdiction founded on the presence of the defendant, who is domiciled in the forum state).
It is also the approach followed in U.S. courts, with the ultimate question governed by the Due Process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ofthe U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Due
Process,Jurisdictionand a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 661 (1999). Analysis of

"in personam" jurisdiction in U.S. courts generally involves a two-step process. The first step is the
application of the state long-arm statute, to determine if the necessary statutory jurisdiction exists. The
second step is the constitutional analysis by which it is determined whether the exercise of statutory
jurisdiction is within the limits of the Due Process Clause. While some state long-arm statutes may have
language similar to that of some of the special jurisdiction provisions ofthe Brussels Convention (providing
reference to the cause of action), it is ultimately the due process analysis that is determinative. See id. at
669-71.
28. This is the approach followed in most of the "special" jurisdictional rules of the Brussels
Convention found in Articles 5-16.
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'special jurisdictions,' by virtue of which a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State
may be sued in another Contracting State ....
29
The principle laid down in the Convention is that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of
the State of the defendant's domicile and that the jurisdiction provided for in [the
"special jurisdiction" articles are] exception[s] to that principle.3"
[T]he 'special jurisdictions' enumerated in Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention constitute
derogations from the principle that jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the State where
the defendant is domiciled and as such must be interpreted restrictively.3

Thus, in Kalfelis v. Schrdder, 2 the European Court of Justice held that, in an
action in both tort (Article 5(3)), and contract (Article 5(1)), "a court which
has jurisdiction under Article 5(3) over an action in so far as it is based on tort
or delict does not have jurisdiction over that action in so far as it is not so
based. '33 The existence of tort jurisdiction in the German courts over a
Luxembourg defendant did not bring with it the existence of contract
jurisdiction over the same defendant resulting from the same set of facts.
The restrictive interpretation of special jurisdiction provisions of the
Brussels Convention was also a part of the decision in the Shevillcase,34 when
the Court stated that the Article 5(3) tort rule ofjurisdiction, as interpreted in
Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace" to provide a two-pronged choice to the
plaintiff,36

29. Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Schroder, 1988 E.C.R. 5565, 5583,

7.

30. Id. at 5583, 8.
31. Id. at5585, 19.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Shevill v. Presse Alliance S.A., Case C-68/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-415. For a more detailed
discussion of the Shevill case, see Ronald A. Brand, Current Problems, Common Ground, and First
Principles:Restructuringthe PreliminaryDraftConvention Text, in AGLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE CONVENTION (John J. Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont eds.,

2002).
35. Case 21/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1735.
36. Paragraph (3) of Article 5 of the Brussels Convention reads as follows:
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued:
(3) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in thecourts for the place where the harmful
event occurred.

In the Bier case, supra note 35, the European Court of Justice interpreted the words "place where the
harmful event occurred" to include both the place where the damage occurred and the place of the event
giving rise to the damage, allowing the plaintiff the choice of locations for bringing suit. Thus, where the
defendant discharged saline into the Rhine River in France, resulting in injuryto the plaintiff's horticultural
interests in The Netherlands, the plaintiff could bring suit in either France or The Netherlands under Article
5(3).
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is based on the existence of a particularly close connecting factor between the dispute and
the courts other than those of the State of the defendant's domicile which justifies the
attribution ofjurisdiction to those courts for reasons relating to the sound administration
of justice and the efficacious conduct of the proceedings.37

Thus, the Court emphasized the court/claim nexus that is the foundation of the
"special" jurisdiction rules of the Brussels Convention.
Three rules of interpretation under the Brussels Convention are thus
clearly established:
(1) Article 2 jurisdiction is more "general" than the rules of special jurisdiction;
(2) the special jurisdiction rules (Articles 5-16) are to be narrowly interpreted; and
(3) the rules of special jurisdiction are based on a close connecting factor between the
dispute and the courts.

For a U.S. observer, cases under the Brussels Convention provide strong
support for a principal focus on jurisdictional rules based on the nexus
between the court and the defendant. In Marinari v. Lloyds Bank,3" the
European Court dealt with the tension between Article 2 of the Brussels
Convention and the special jurisdiction rules (specifically Article 5(3)) when
it stated,
The choice thus available to the plaintiff cannot however be extended beyond the
particular circumstances which justify it. Such extension would negate the general
principle laid down in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention that the courts
of the Contracting State where the defendant is domiciled are to have jurisdiction."

Thus, the jurisprudence of the Brussels system demonstrates a clear
preference for the court/defendant nexus, and provides less than complete
certainty in the application of the "special" rules of jurisdiction that allow
divergence from this general principle. This seems to acknowledge that, if we
are determining when a court should have authority to dictate the conduct of
a person, then we should be asking what it is thatjustifies the exercise of that
authority over that person. From a U.S. perspective, the Brussels
jurisprudence seems to confirm the value of a court/defendant nexus. What
is less clear, is why it then allows jurisdiction to exist where no such nexus
exists. The rules that base jurisdiction solely on a court/claim nexus not only
diverge from the principal rule of the Brussels system, but also open the
possibility of violations of due process in the United States.

37. Shevill, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-459, 19.
38. Case C-364/93, 1995 E.C.R. 2719.
39. Id. at 1-2739, 13.
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It may be that most states other than the United States base jurisdictional
rules on a court/claim nexus. To do so seems, however, to avoid the question
of when it is reasonable for a court to exercise authority over a specific
person.4" A global convention should address this question directly, and the
only way to do so is to deal with the only nexus existing in the question: the
relationship between the court and the person over whom judicial authority is
to be exercised.
VII. COMBINING JURISDICTIONAL CONCEPTS

The efforts of the Hague negotiations to find common ground on bases
of jurisdiction can be demonstrated by reference to the provisions in the
Hague texts dealing with jurisdiction in matters relating to tort and contract.
The evolution of these provisions demonstrates a conscious effort on the part
of the negotiators to bring together systems emphasizing a court-claim nexus
and those emphasizing a court-defendant nexus. This can be demonstrated by
considering aspects of Article 5 of the Brussels Regulation, how those rules
have entered the Hague texts, and how they have then evolved in the
negotiation process. Article 5 of the Brussels Regulation provides for
jurisdiction in contract and tort cases as follows:
A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be sued:
in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of
1. (a)
the obligation in question
(b)
for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, the place of
performance of the obligation in question shall be:
- in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a Member State where, under
the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered,
- in the case of the provision of services, the place in a Member State where,
under the contract, the services were provided or should have been
provided,
if subparagraph (b) does not apply then subparagraph (a) applies;
(c)
3. in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict,in the courts for the place where the
harmful event occurred or may occur;

40. See, e.g., the distinction in Dumez between Advocate General Darmon's opinion that indirect
damage is included under the two-prong test of Bier,supranote 35, but is suffered where the direct damage
occurs, and the Court's opinion that the location of indirect damage (assumed to be at the domicile of the
plaintiff) is not encompassed in the Bier second prong. Case C-220/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1-49 (opinion of
Advocate General Damon at 1-63, et seq. and Judgment at 1-78 et seq.).
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This approach was incorporated in the 1999 Preliminary Draft Hague
Convention in Articles 6 and 10, respectively, which contained the following
language:
Article 6 Contracts
A plaintiff may bring an action in contract in the courts of a State in whicha) in matters relating to the supply of goods, the goods were supplied in whole or in
part;
b) in matters relating to the provision of services, the services were provided in
whole or in part;
c) in matters relating both to the supply of goods and the provision of services,
performance of the principal obligation took place in whole or in part.
Article 10 Torts or Delicts
1. A plaintiff may bring an action in tort or delict in the courts of the Statea) in which the act or omission that caused injury occurred, or
b) in which the injury arose, unless the defendant establishes that the person claimed
to be responsible could not reasonably have foreseen that the act or omission
could result in an injury of the same nature in that State.

The U.S. approach to jurisdiction in basic contract and tort cases has
elements that are in some ways similar to the Brussels approach. This can be
seen in the text of state long-arm statutes, which often include language
referring to the place of injury or place of contract performance.4 Unlike the
civil law approach to jurisdiction, however, the U.S. approach follows a twostep process. Jurisdiction must first exist according to the state long-arm
statute.4 2 Once it is determined that state long-arm jurisdiction exists, then the

41. See, e.g., NEWYORK CIv. PRAC. L. &R. § 302 (McKinney's 1990), which provides in part:
Personal Jurisdiction by Acts of Non-domiciliaries

(a) Acts which are the basis ofjurisdiction. As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or

his executor or administrator, who in person or through an agent:
(1) transacts anybusiness within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services
in the state; or
(2) commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of
character arising from the act; or
(3) commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the
state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered,
in the state, or,
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and
derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or
(4) owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
42. Even in federal court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) authorizes a district court to
borrow the jurisdictional powers of state courts in the state where the court is located.
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court must determine whether that exercise ofjurisdiction is within the limits
of the Due Process clause.4 3 At this point, the focus moves from the
connection between the court and the claim to the connection between the
court and the defendant. Thus, the U.S. approach focuses ultimately on
justification for the exercise of judicial authority over the defendant-and a
state long-arm statute cannot create jurisdiction where to do so would go
beyond the limits of the Due Process clause. This focus on due process has
brought a jurisprudence analyzing the activity of the defendant within the
forum state, and the extent to which that activity makes it reasonable to
exercise judicial authority in regard to the specific persons involved." Thus,
the court-claim focus of civil law judicial competence is replaced in the U.S.
with a court-defendant focus onpersonaljurisdictionover the defendant.
In the informal meetings leading up to the first weeks of the Diplomatic
Conference in June 2001, efforts were made to combine these two approaches
to contract and tort jurisdiction. The first paragraph of each of Articles 6 and
10 was retained, providing the court-claim connection, and a second paragraph
was added to each, providing a court-defendant nexus. After the Edinburgh
meeting in April 2001, the new paragraph 2 of each of these articles read as
follows:
Article 6 Contracts
2. A plaintiff may bring an action in contract in the courts of the State in which the
defendant has engaged in frequent or significant activity, or has [intentionally]
directed such activity into that State, for the purpose of promoting [the conclusion of
contracts] [or negotiating] or performing a contract,
provided that the claim is based
43
on a contract directly related to that activity.
Article 10 Torts or Delicts
2. A plaintiffmay bring an action in tort or delict in the courts of the State in which the
defendant has engaged in frequent or significant activity, or has [intentionally]
directed such activity into that State, provided that the claim arises out of that
activity.46

Thus, the approach in the informal meetings was to include elements of both
the civil law court-claim nexus and the U.S. "activity-based" court-defendant
nexus. This approach was retained in the June 2001 Diplomatic Conference

43.
44.
45.
46.

See Brand, supra note 23, at 671 et seq.
See id. at 672-687.
Informationalnote, supra note 9.
Id.
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draft ofArticle 10, which made minor changes to the Edinburgh language, and
includes the following text:
Article 10 Torts [orDelicts]
1. A plaintiff may bring an action in tort [or delict] in the courts of the Statea) in which the act or omission that caused injury occurred, or
b) in which the injury arose, unless the defendant establishes that the person claimed
to be responsible could not reasonably have foreseen that the act or omission
could result in an injury of the same nature in that State.
[2.
A plaintiff may bring an action in tort in the courts of the State in which the
defendant has engaged in frequent or significant activity, or has directed such
activity into that State, provided that the claim arises out of that activity and the
overall connection of the defendant to that
State makes it reasonable that the
47
defendant be subject to suit in that State.]

An effort was made at the June 2001 Diplomatic Conference session to

combine the two approaches in the first paragraph of Article 6, with an initial
focus on the defendant's activity, and a second paragraph defining activity in
a way that reinserts the claim-focused element of the civil law approach. This
is represented in the Interim Text as an alternative to the Edinburgh approach,
and includes variants representing both a limited and a general approach to the
concept of activity. The following is the Article 6 language found in the
Interim Text:
Article 6 Contracts
[1.
Subject to the provisions of Articles 7 and 8,] a plaintiff may bring an action in
contract in the courts of the Statea) in which the defendant has conducted frequent [and] [or] significant activity; [or
b) into which the defendant has directed frequent [and] [or] significant activity;]
provided that the claim is based on a contract directly related to that activity [and
the overall connection of the defendant to that State makes it reasonable that the
defendant be subject to suit in that State.]
Variant 1:
2. For the purposes of the preceding paragraph, 'activity' means one or more of the
followinga) [regular and substantial] promotion ofthe commercial or professional ventures of
the defendant for the conclusion of contracts of this kind;
b) the defendant's regular or extended presence for the purpose of negotiating
contracts of this kind, provided that the contract in question was performed at least
in part in that State. [Performance in this sub-paragraph refers [only] to nonmonetary performance, except in case of loans or of contracts for the purchase and
sale of currency];

47. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction and
ForeignJudgments in Civil andCommercialMatters, Working Document 98 (19 June 2001) (copy on file
with author).
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c) the performance of a contract by supplying goods or services, as a whole or to a
significant part.
Variant 2:
2. For the purpose of the preceding paragraph, 'activity' includes, inter alia, the
promotion, negotiation, and performance of a contract. 8

The combination of variants (indicating choices yet to be made) and
bracketed words (indicating a lack of consensus on specific language) in the
Interim Text demonstrates significant uncertainty in terms of a final product
at the end ofthe June 2001 Diplomatic Conference. It does indicate, however,
a concerted effort to find words that will incorporate both the court-claim,
"competence" approach of civil law traditions and the court-defendant,
"personal jurisdiction over the defendant" approach of U.S. jurisprudence.
Language that encompasses both the court/claim and court/defendant
nexus demonstrates the willingness of delegations to work together in an
attempt to achieve global rules that could be applied in national courts with
the hope of similar results. Unfortunately, the failure to provide rules that will
consistently result in both adequate court-claim nexus for Brussels systems
states and adequate court-defendant nexus for U.S. due process purposes
resulted in rules still incapable of generating global consensus.
VIII. KEY ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IF A COMPREHENSIVE
CONVENTION IS TO BE ACHIEVED

The difficulties in reaching acceptable language for tort and contract
jurisdiction rules were not the only problems preventing an adequate Interim
Text. Differences on the prohibited list remained without clear hope of
resolution. An early compromise on the application of rules of lis pendens
andforum non conveniens in Articles 21 and 22 remained open to further
discussion. The Article 33 early compromise language on damages
enforcement resulted in continued discussion. Article 7 of the Interim Text
demonstrated the morass of issues and positions on jurisdictional rules
applicable to consumer contracts. Article 12 remained under debate on
questions of exclusive jurisdiction, especially in the growing area of
intellectual property rights. No clear solution had been reached regarding how
any resulting convention would intersect with existing conventions and
regional instruments such as the Brussels Regulation. And the advent and
growth of electronic commerce during the negotiations meant that the

48.

Interim Text, supranote 11, art. 6.
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delegates were being asked to lock in global rules of jurisdiction in areas in
which national legal systems had not yet reached adequate solutions.
IX.

CONCLUSIONS:

U.S.-EU RELATIONS

IN LIGHT OF THE HAGUE

NEGOTIATIONS

The parallel evolution of Community competence for external matters of
judicial cooperation and the consideration of a global convention on
jurisdiction and recognition of judgments at The Hague have created
important dynamics in international relations regarding the development of
private international law. A review of this process serves to highlight the
ever-growing role of the relationship between the United States and the
European Community. The fact that instruments dealing with judicial
cooperation within the Community will now issue from Brussels means that
the role of the Hague Conference on Private International Law must change
from that of a "Euro-centric" organization to that of a global institution. If
this change does not occur, the relevance of the Hague Conference can only
diminish. A corollary to this is that there must be adjustments in procedures
at the Hague Conference in order to accommodate EU participation and make
that participation fit with the role of other delegations. This will require
changes in voting procedures, necessitating a consensus approach to most
issues.
The changes that have affected negotiations in The Hague also have
important implications for the bilateral relationship between the United States
and the European Union. This relationship has become crucial to the
negotiation of a convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and
enforcement ofjudgments. It will likely become more important in other fora
(such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT) that deal with matters of private
international law. For the judgments convention, success likely will depend
on whether the U.S. and Europe can reach a mutually satisfactory approach to
a text. Ultimately, however, the only possibility for a judgments convention
that can be effective on a global scale lies in a mixed convention that is much
less comprehensive than the Brussels Regulation now in effect in the
European Union.

